Enforcement of Forum Selection Agreements in Contracts between Unequal Parties by Noles, Cindy
ENFORCEMENT OF FORUM SELECTION
AGREEMENTS IN CONTRACTS BETWEEN
UNEQUAL PARTIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Parties to a contract may choose a tribunal to which disputes
between them will be brought, i e., they may agree to submit
disputes to arbitration or may designate the court or courts of a
particular state.' Generally, contracting parties provide for ju-
dicial settlement of disputes by means of a choice-of-forum clause
inserted into the contract.2 Two questions arise with regard to the
efficacy of these clauses: 1) to what extent they are mandatory,
and 2) to what extent they are effective in conferring jurisdiction
on a court where jurisdiction does not exist independently of the
agreement.' In recent years, choice-of-forum agreements have
been upheld in international contracts, and courts have dismissed
actions brought in violation of forum selection clauses, even where
the court chosen had little apparent connection with the contract.
In certain circumstances, however, clauses in international con-
tracts limiting jurisdiction over disputes have been held unen-
forceable. A refusal to enforce typically occurs when the court
determines that a substantial inequality in bargaining power ex-
isted at the time the contract was formed.5 For example, courts
have not allowed a choice-of-forum clause to benefit a party with
superior bargaining power who could force a weaker party to sub-
mit to the jurisdiction of a forum it would not otherwise have
chosen.'
The effect given to choice-of-forum clauses has special sig-
nificance with regard to contracts involving developing countries.
Transnational corporations based in developed countries general-
ly have enjoyed economically superior bargaining positions in
their dealings with developing countries.7 This lack of economic
Pryles, Comparative Aspects of Prorogation and Arbitration Agreements, 25 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 543 (1976).
Choice-of-forum clause is synonymous with choice-of-court clause and prorogation
agreement.
' Pryles, supra note 1, at 543.
' Christie, Techniques for Settlement of Transactional Disputes Involving Transfer of
Technology, 14 TEX. INT'L L.J. 264, 266-67 (1979).
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power presents a substantial impediment to the expansion and
diversification of trade necessary for economic development, and
it is increasingly apparent that preferential treatment for
developing countries is necessary to improve their economic
status.8 The need for preferential treatment is manifested in con-
tracts between companies of developed countries and private and
public sectors of developing countries. In practice, foreign-based
enterprises operating in developing countries often insert both
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses in their contracts in an
attempt to obtain the law most advantageous to the enterprise.
After surveying the motivations for investment in the developing
world, this Note analyzes the extent to which the unique problems
of developing countries should be taken into consideration when a
court decides the effect to be given a choice-of-forum clause in a
contract involving a developing country. Treatment of such
clauses in the United States and other Western nations is then
highlighted.
II. INVESTMENT IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
One of the areas of dissension among developed and developing
nations involves investment and transfer of technology agree-
ments. Clearly, investment by the developed world is essential to
supply the technology, capital, and managerial expertise in
developing economies.' Investment also serves the interests of in-
vestors who seek new markets, lower costs of production, and
sources of supply." Equally clear is that continued trade between
developed and developing countries depends upon maintaining a
balance of benefits between both parties to the trade
relationship."
Foreign investment stimulates development in several ways.
First, the transfer of technology incident to investment provides
information that would otherwise be unavailable to the host coun-
try.12 The foreign enterprise may aid in the education of the local
population in management, marketing, and technological skills.
Id. at 71.
" ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, INVESTING IN DEVELOP
ING COUNTRIES 6 (4th ed. 1978).
10 Id.
" Brown, Changing the Rules: International Law and the Developing Countries: The
ABA Workshops of 1977, 12 INT'L LAW. 265, 272 (1978).
12 Camerini, Argentina as a Host Country for North American Investments, 9 INT'L
LAW, 407, 409 (1975).
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Second, employment opportunities created within the non-
managerial labor class may result in increased domestic wages
and consequent improvement in labor relations." Third, invest-
ment may provide a catalyst for increased competition within the
domestic market."' Fourth, capital inflow into the developing coun-
try is aided when enterprises establish contacts with foreign
banks, capital markets, markets for production, and sales organi-
zations 5 Finally, tax revenues from foreign enterprises augment
the treasuries of developing countries, filling savings and foreign
exchange gaps."8
Developing countries traditionally have offered incentives to
investment by foreign enterprises, recognizing the fact that com-
panies based in developed countries usually will invest in develop-
ing countries that offer a substantial profit expectation with a con-
current low risk of loss. 7 Incentives to investment include raw
materials, low-cost labor, inexpensive sources of power, and prox-
imity to potential markets. State-created inducements include
mineral concessions, restrictions on labor organization, and fa-
vorable tax treatment.'8 The host country may also provide such
inducements as duty-free imports of intermediate goods, free ac-
cess to foreign currency, depreciation rates, and special depletion
allowances providing compensation for future exhaustion of mines
and oil fields. 9
Developing countries recognize the vital importance of foreign
investment in economic growth. At the same time, they are ex-
tremely sensitive to exploitation.0 Multinational enterprises,
which constitute the principal source of investment in the devel-
oping world, are often distrusted by developing countries, and
their leaders resent delegation of decision-making from sub-
sidiaries within host countries to the parent corporation and
hence beyond the reach of the sovereign power of the host coun-
13 Id.
14 Id.
"5 Id. at 410.
I d.
' Jova, Private Investment in Latin America: Renegotiating the Bargain, 10 TEX. INT'L.
L.J. 455, 458 (1975).
"S In Latin America, foreign corporations have been allowed "grace years" in which in-
vestors are exempted from taxes in order to transmit profits to home countries. E.
UTRECHT, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 38 (1976).
19 Id.
" I. SZASZY, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN THE WESTERN, SOCIALIST AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
66 (1974).
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try.21 Control of subsidiaries by parent companies is especially
resented where the enterprise constitutes a significant percen-
tage of the economic life of the host country.
In this context, government control over economic policy is se-
verely diminished. Where important decisions regarding the sub-
sidiary are made outside the host country, no increase in exper-
tise is achieved by local executives. In addition, enterprises
operating in developing countries are criticized for borrowing ex-
clusively from parent corporations, thereby frustrating the goal of
development of local banking facilities." Foreign enterprises are
also faulted for exercising restrictive business practices, par-
ticularly in countries having few or no statutory prohibitions.23 In
these countries, foreign enterprises may use monopolistic powers
to thwart development of local enterprises. Another criticism of
multinationals is their failure to sell shares locally, and their resul-
tant failure to contribute to the formation of a national capital
market. 4 As development progresses and the host country's need
for ,the benefits of investment decreases, problems incident to for-
eign investment tend to increase. Although this plateau has not
been reached, the leaders of many developing countries presently
believe that the benefits from foreign investment are outweighed
by the disadvantages of involvement with foreign enterprises. 5 It
is within this larger context that the issue of choice-of-forum
clauses is most profitably approached.
III. THE CONTRACTING PROCESS: INEQUALITY IN BARGAINING
POWER
In the debate over the role of multinational corporations in
developing countries, views such as the following are most in-
sightful:
Amid the current controversy over multinational corpora-
tions, uncompensated expropriations, alleged political machina-
tions by foreign companies, discriminatory laws, "dependency,"
"neo-colonialism," etc., it is easy to fall prey to good-and-evil
theories, which depict the present situation in terms of
nefarious plotting or exploitative deception on the part of one







side or the other. In the process, the historical aspects of the
foreign investment phenomenon-and in particular its two-
sided, negotiated character-tend to be forgotten."
The nature of the negotiating process between developed and
developing countries is the subject of considerable dispute. Many
would argue that in the contractual situation, developing coun-
tries exert little negotiating power and that too often bargaining
power is weighted in favor of the foreign enterprise. Because the
foreign investor frequently has the option of locating elsewhere if
the developing country presses for more favorable terms,' the
position of developing countries has been equated with the status
of consumers in adhesion contracts.28 Developing countries argue
that although they are forced to deal with foreign companies due
to a crucial need for investment and technology, they lack the
negotiating skills and power of the corporations and therefore are
unable to bargain effectively.'
Inequality in bargaining power between developed and develop-
ing countries may affect the choice of a forum for the resolution of
disputes between parties to a contract." Developing countries, in
general, desire national court jurisdiction over disputes arising
under contracts with foreign enterprises. 1 National jurisdiction
over foreigners is defended on the grounds of equality of treat-
ment with domestic companies and protection of nationals from in-
creased costs of litigation in foreign courts.2
In contrast, and not surprisingly, enterprises of developed coun-
tries urge maximization of contractual freedom.3 Companies claim
that contractual relations with developing countries are interna-
tional in character and that the parties should be free to choose
the legal system applicable to the contract. 4 Enterprises also
Jova, supra note 17, at 457.
2 Id. at 472.
2 Brown, supra note 11, at 281.
29Id
" In the Latin American countries, the Calvo Clause ensures that disputes arising under
an investment agreement will be litigated in the host country. The clause applies to con-
tracts with Latin American governments and has two basic principles: (1) non-interference
in the sovereignty of the state; and (2) absolute subjection of foreign enterprises to the laws
and jurisdiction of the host country. See Jova, supra note 17, at 466.
31 Roffe, Reflections on Current Attempts to Revise International Legal Structures:
The North-South Dialogue-Clash of Values and Concepts, Contradictions and Com-
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argue that national courts of host countries may be biased.3 ' Fur-
thermore, enterprises doing business in developing countries pro-
fess a lack of trust in national courts of developing countries with
newly-established legal systems.
Contractual freedom in the area of choice-of-forum would
benefit business entities operating within developing countries.
Foreign enterprises seeking predictability and certainty of litiga-
tion may rely on a choice-of-law clause as a means of decreasing
the risk inherent in a contract transcending national boundaries.
However, a choice-of-law clause may not be totally effective in
controlling the law to be applied to the contract. 7 There is always
a chance that the foreign court may elect not to apply the chosen
law, or that it may be difficult or expensive to prove the law
stipulated in the contract. 8 Therefore, the company inserts both
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions in the contract to pro-
tect against the risk of litigation in courts of developing
countries. 9
IV. CONTRACT DISPUTES-CHOICE-OF-FORUM AGREEMENTS
A. United States Treatment of Choice-of-Forum Clauses
Prior to this decade courts in the United States generally re-
fused to enforce choice-of-forum clauses if the case satisfied
jurisdictional requirements." This refusal to dismiss cases
brought in violation of forum agreements usually was based on
the ouster doctrine, the concept that parties to a contract may not
"oust" a court of jurisdiction. 1 Gradually, forum clauses began to
be regarded with less hostility. In Wm. H. Muller & Co. v.
Swedish American Line Ltd. ,42 the court affirmed the dismissal of
a suit where bills of lading used by a Swedish shipowner
stipulated that disputes under the contract would be litigated in
Swedish courts. The court treated the forum clause as a means of
dismissing the case on forum non conveniens grounds.43 In the pro-
" Id. at 567.
36 Id.




" Id. at 51.
41 Id.




cess, the court employed a reasonableness standard, stating that
the clause should control unless unreasonable under the cir-
cumstances.44 Although Muller was subsequently overruled on the
ground that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA),45 (which
prohibited exculpatory clauses) forbade forum-selection clauses,"
the case is still cited as authority in opinions upholding choice-of-
court agreements.
In Carbon Black Export v. The S. S. Monrosa,5 the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider a Fifth Cir-
cuit decision allowing actions brought by an American exporter in
disregard of a forum selection clause in a contract with an Italian
shipping company.49 The court of appeals had held that with
respect to the in personam action the clause could not be enforced,
reiterating that agreements to oust the jurisdiction of a court are
contrary to public policy. 0 The Supreme Court dismissed the writ
as improvidently granted after the majority agreed that the case
was not appropriate for consideration of the enforceability of
choice-of-court provisions because the provision did not exclude
the maintenance of an in rem action."1 In dismissing the writ, the
Supreme Court avoided the opportunity to determine the validity
of choice-of-forum agreements, and the case law remained
equivocal.
In 1972, the Supreme Court was called upon to review a judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit52 which refused
to enforce a choice-of-forum clause in an international towage con-
tract. In MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Company,3 the
44 Id
41 Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-05 (1976).
Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ramborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.1967).
See, e.g., Furbee v. Vantage Press, 464 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir.1972).
" 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
See generally Nadelmann, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the United States: The Road to
Zapata, 21 AM. J. COMp. L. 124, 130 (1973).
, Id.
51 Id.
12 Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. MIS Bremen, 428 F.2d 888 (1970).
m 407 U.S. 1 (1972). The contract between respondent Zapata, an American corporation,
and petitioner Unterweser, a German corporation, stipulated that disputes would be
brought before the London Court of Justice. While Unterweser's tug, the Bremen, was in
the process of towing Zapata's drilling rig from Louisiana to Italy, a storm arose in the Gulf
of Mexico and the rig was severely damaged. The rig was towed to Tampa, Florida where
Zapata brought suit in admiralty in the United States District Court in Tampa seeking
$3,500,000 damages against Unterweser in personam and the Bremen in rem alleging
negligent towage and breach of contract. Unterweser responded by invoking the forum-
selection clause of the contract. The district court denied Unterweser's motion to dismiss or
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Supreme Court reversed, and adopted the rule that choice-of-
forum clauses are prima facie valid unless demonstrated to be
unreasonable under the circumstances surrounding the contract. 4
In arriving at this result, the Court took note of the need for
forum selection clauses in an era of rapid expansion in inter-
national trade by United States businesses." The Court also noted
that the result brought United States law into congruence with
English law and with the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws," both of which allow choice-of-forum agreements. 7
The Supreme Court rejected the argument in Zapata that
choice-of-forum clauses amount to an ouster of a court's jurisdic-
tion.58 The Court emphasized that the real question raised by a
forum-selection clause is not whether the clause "ousts" the court
of jurisdiction but whether the court should give effect to the par-
ties' agreement to litigate in another forum.59
In a later case, the Supreme Court expanded the holding of
Zapata by concluding that an agreement in an international com-
mercial contract to submit disputes to arbitration is enforceable.
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,0 the Supreme Court recognized
stay the proceedings and the court of appeals affirmed, relying on the language in Carbon
Black Export, Inc. v. The Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S.
180 (1959), that "agreements in advance of controversy whose object is to oust the jurisdic-
tion of the courts are contrary to public policy and will not be enforced." 254 F.2d at 300-01.
407 U.S. at 10 (1972).
The Court stated:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if,
notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts. We cannot have
trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our
terms, governed by our laws and resolved in our courts.
Id. at 9.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §80. The parties' agreement as to the
place of the action cannot oust a state of judicial jurisdiction, but such an agreement will be
given effect unless it is unfair or unreasonable.
5 407 U.S. at 11 n.12 (1972).
Id. at 12.
5' Id The Court recognized that:
No one seriously contends in this case that the forum-selection clause 'ousted' the
District Court of jurisdiction over Zapata's action. The threshold question is
whether that court should have exercised its jursidiction to do more than give ef-
fect to the legitimate expectations of the parties' manifested in their freely
negotiated agreement, by spegifically enforcing the forum clause.
Id
417 U.S. 506 (1974). Alberto-Culver, an American manufacturer, had contracted to pur-
chase the enterprises and trademark rights of Scherk, a German citizen. The contract con-
tained warranties that the trademarks were unencumbered and included a clause providing
that disputes arising between the parties would be referred to arbitration in France. The
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the uncertainty concerning the law applicable to possible disputes
arising from a contract between entities of two or more countries
and noted that "[a] contractual provision specifying in advance the
forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be ap-
plied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to
achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any
international business transaction."'" The Court found the princi-
ple of Zapata controlling in the context of arbitration agreements
where enforcement of the agreement would not be unreasonable
under the Zapata criteria."2
Cases subsequent to Zapata have embellished the law concern-
ing choice-of-forum clauses in international contracts. In Gaskin v.
Stumm Handel GmbH.,3 the court considered the effect of a
forum-selection clause in an employment contract that designated
West Germany as the site for litigating disputes. The court
analyzed the facts of the case under the two-pronged test
established in Zapata. First, the court considered, under an "in-
validity test," whether the forum clause was voidable for reasons
of fraud, overreaching, mistake, coercion, lack of consideration, or
unconscionability.64 Second, the court considered whether def-
erence to the forum clause would be unreasonable or unjust,
essentially applying a "reasonableness test."65 The court listed
seven factors to be considered in determining whether enforce-
ment of the terms of the contract would be unreasonable: (1) ine-
quality of bargaining power; (2) public policy; (3) injustice; (4)
availability of remedies in the chosen forum; (5) the governing law;
(6) inconvenience; and (7) conduct of the parties.66 The choice-of-
court clause in Gaskin was enforced because the court found that
the party resisting the enforcement of the clause failed to prove
either its invalidity or its unreasonableness under the criteria
established. 7 The court stated that there was no evidence dem-
trademarks were discovered to be subject to encumbrances and when Scherk refused to
rescind the contract, Alberto-Culver instituted suit in the United States. The court of ap-
peals affirmed the district court's dismissal of Scherk's motion to stay the action pending
arbitration in Paris. Id. at 508-10.
Id. at 516.
62 Id at 519.
390 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Id at 365.
Id at 368.
Id. at 305, quoting Collins, Choice-of-Forum and the Exercise of Judicial Discre-
tion-The Resolution of an Anglo-American Conflict, 22 INTL & COmP. L.Q. 332, 338-43
(1973).
" 390 F. Supp. at 370.
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onstrating overwhelming bargaining power or an adhesion con-
tract, and that there was no evidence contradicting the conclusion
that "[the] choice of . . . forum was made in an arm's length
negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen.""
Similarly, in Republic International Corp. v. Amco Engineers,
Inc.,69 the court held that an action on a construction contract
should be dismissed when a forum-selection clause provided for
litigation in Uraguay.7 ° The court found the Zapata decision, which
was directed to federal courts sitting in admiralty, applicable to
other kinds of international contracts because of the Zapata
Court's emphasis upon "an appreciation of the expanding horizons
of American contractors, who seek business in all parts of the
world."71
The new approach to choice-of-forum agreements in the United
States has been universally praised by scholars in the field as pro-
moting international commercial relations.72 The trend established
by Zapata and later cases is to enforce choice-of-forum clauses in
contract disputes brought in federal courts." Under the trend
upholding forum clauses, a party resisting enforcement will be
under a heavy burden to show why the court should disregard the
clause.74
B. Choice-of-Forum Agreements Outside the United States
Legislation governing choice-of-forum agreements is relatively
uncommon in the common law countries.75 Instead, reliance is plac-
ed upon the power of the courts to refrain from ousting the suit
from their jurisdiction when the clause is found to be unrea-
68 390 F. Supp. at 369, quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. at 12 (1972).
516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975).
7M Id at 168.
71 /d&
" See, e.g., Reese, The Supreme Court Supports Enforcement of Choice-of-Forum
Clauses, 7 INTL LAW. 530 (1973).
" Although Zapata and subsequent federal decisions are not controlling in state courts,
it is apparent that state courts are following the trend established by the federal cases.
Decisions to dismiss actions based on contracts containing choice-of-court clauses have been
rendered where the court has discovered no evidence of unequal bargaining power or fraud,
and where enforcement of the clause was found not to violate some state policy. See, e.g.,
Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan, GmbH., 611 P.2d 498 (1980); and Soci6t6 Jean Nicolas et
Fils, J.B., v. Mousseux, 123 Ariz. 59, 597 P.2d 541 (1979). State courts have declined to en-
force choice-of-forum clauses where the forum chosen by the parties was unreasonable due
to serious inconvenience. See, e.g., Exum v. Vantage Press, Inc., 17 Wash. App. 477, 563
P.2d 1314 (1977).
" See Juenger, supra note 37, at 58.
" See Nadelmann, supra note 49, at 131.
702 [Vol. 11:3
CONFLICTS OF LAW
sonable." In civil law countries, legislation regulates the use of
choice-of-court clauses in areas such as installment buying and in-
surance." Generally, courts will not intervene without a showing
of fraud or duress.
In England, the judge is given the discretion to decide whether
to enforce a choice-of-forum agreement. 79 The English system dis-
tinguishes between clauses that bind the parties to the exclusive
jurisdiction of a court and clauses that designate the non-exclusive
jurisdiction of a foreign court." Generally, the clause is binding
only when it provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts
of a particular country.81 English courts will enforce an agreement
by granting leave to commence proceedings outside the jurisdic-
tion, if the defendant is outside the jurisdiction." Where the
clause designates a foreign court and the plaintiff sues in the
English court, the defendant may apply to the court for a stay of
those proceedings." In Great Britain, Australia, and the common
law provinces of Canada, it is established that a choice-of-court
clause cannot oust the local courts of jursidiction, although the
court may use its discretion to grant a stay in the proceedings. 4
To prevent the court from granting a stay "the plaintiff must
show 'some good cause' why the English proceedings should con-
tinue, or 'a strong case' why the proceedings should not be
stayed." 5
In Germany, parties may select a court for the resolution of
disputes either by express or implied agreement." The choice is
valid except in certain situations falling within the rules of the




See Kahn-Freund, Jurisdiction Agreements: Some Reflections, 26 INT'L & COMp. L.Q.
825, 849 (1977). "The fundamental characteristic of the English system is that the judge has
the power to stay the action, but that the law does not compel him to do so. He has a discre-
tion. This gives to English law in this matter a great deal of desirable flexibility." Id.
80 Collins, Choice-of-Forum and the Exercise of Judicial Discretion- The Resolution of
an Anglo-American Conflict, 22 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 332, 333 (1973).
8 Id. at 334.
82 1&
83 Id.
' Pryles, supra note 1, at 556.
85 Collins, supra note 80, at 335.
A. DROBNIG, AMERICAN-GERMAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 323 (1972). A choice-of-
forum agreement is implied where the defendant pleads to the merits of the case without
objecting that the court lacks competence.
"7 Pryles, supra note 1, at 569.
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portant limitation on party autonomy in choice-of-forum is section
40 of the Code, which provides that "no contractual change of com-
petence is allowed as to non-pecuniary claims and those pecuniary
claims which fall under an exclusive competence."88 Under this
provision, choice-of-forum agreements are not effective in non-
pecuniary family law, in certain personal rights disputes, or in
matters over which the German court has been given exclusive
jurisdiction.89
Under French law, contractual freedom of the parties to choose
a forum for the settlement of disputes between them is fundamen-
tal.90 Accordingly, the privileges extended to French nationals
under articles 14 and 15 of the Civil Code (i.e., to be subject to the
jurisdiction of French courts) may be waived by an express agree-
ment conferring jurisdiction on a foreign court. 1 However, French
judges are critical of implied agreements to waive jurisdiction,
and in the absence of an express agreement to litigate in a foreign
court, there is no presumption of waiver.2 There is no limit to the
scope of a choice-of-forum clause in France. Such agreements are
enforced whether the cause of action arises in contract or some
other area, whether the action is in personam or in rem, and
whether the object is real or personal property. 3
Contractual agreements excluding local jurisdiction are effec-
tive in a number of other European countries. 4 For example, in
Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Fin-
land, and the Netherlands, forum agreements generally are effec-
tive to exclude local jurisdiction. 5 Conversely, in Spain, Portugal,
and Hungary, no effect is given to choice-of-forum clauses confer-
89 Id.
9o Lenhoff, The Parties' Choice of a Forum: "Prorogation Agreements", 15 RUTGERS L.
REV. 414, 440 (1960-1961).
1 Id. at 442.
92 Id. As Lenhoff states:
[TIhe promise made by an employee in the employment contract to the effect that
he would move his domicile to the main place of the employer's business situated
in a foreign country was not held to be a choice of a court, there, as the exclusive
forum for disputes arising out of the employment relationship. Likewise, in an un-
broken line of decisions, it has been held that the choice of a legal system of a
foreign country, which the parties had chosen as the law controlling their con-
tract, could not be considered as an implied submission to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the foreign country.
Id. at 442-43.
9' Id. at 448.




ring exclusive jurisdiction on foreign courts." In Italy, choice-of-
forum clauses are only effective to exclude Italian jurisdiction if
the agreement is in writing and relates to an in personam action
involving at least one foreigner.97 Outside of Europe, choice-of-
forum agreements have been given effect, except in certain cir-
cumstances, in Japan, Turkey, Brazil, and Argentina. 8
V. CONCLUSION
In the settlement of contractual disputes with developing coun-
tries, developed countries advocate maximization of party auto-
nomy in the choice of a forum. On the other hand, developing
countries, principally in investment and transfer of technology
agreements, insist on the exclusive jurisdiction of the host coun-
try.9 Hence, a compromise is necessary for the settlement of con-
tractual disputes between developed and developing states.
Preferential treatment for developing countries is urged pri-
marily because of the alleged inferior bargaining position of many
developing countries in contract negotiations. ' This disparity in
bargaining power is particularly apparent in the context of
multinational corporations dealing with developing countries. "As
far as bargaining is concerned, it is generally considered that
TNCs (transnational corporations), with their command over re-
sources, markets and technology, their ability to manipulate
prices and their possession of bargaining skills, are able to extract
more concessions from host governments than small or local firms
can do.""'' Developing countries insist that without special treat-
96 Id.
9' Id- at 570-71.
9' Id. at 571.
Christie, supra note 4, at 266.
100 Consider, for example, the following statement of a Mexican official:
Legal transactions, either domestic or international, are based on the principle
of equal standing of both parties involved. However, in the real world the party
selling, licensing, leasing, lending, etc., is generally the one with more bargaining
power. When this difference in bargaining power is too great, then instead of
reducing the gap between the powerful and weak, dependence and inferiority is
increased. When these unjust transactions become commonplace, it is time for the
legal system to revive its norms and issue new legal standards to reduce or if
possible to eliminate this disparity.
Maria de Lourdes Jimenez de Padierna, Counsel, Office of the Director General of the Na-
tional Registry for the Transfer of Technology (Secretariat of Industry and Commerce,
Mexico), cited in Brown, supra note 11, at 275.
02 S. LALL & P. STREETEN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, TRANSNATIONALS AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 77 (1977).
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ment in the area of commercial relations, development will con-
tinue to be encumbered by the activities of foreign enterprises.
Developed countries support contractual freedom in the selec-
tion of dispute settlement mechanisms outside the boundaries of
the host country. Representatives of companies operating in and
dealing with developing countries assert their willingness to ac-
cept any system of law to govern their contracts as long as the
law is equitable and reasonably certain. 102 However, companies
operating in developing countries claim that in the majority of
developing countries the law is too uncertain and unpredictable to
be relied upon, and therefore desire the protection of a forum out-
side the developing country.'013
Choice-of-forum clauses have been discussed in the negotiations
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) on a Code of Conduct for the Transfer of Technology. °4
Compromise positions have been advanced that the Code
designate jurisdictions in which actions may be brought, so that
the party has the option of bringing the action in one of several
jurisdictions, or that the Code allow jurisdiction based on the ex-
istence of basic contacts between the parties, the transaction, and
the state.' Choice-of-forum clauses would be valid to the extent
that they complied with these jurisdictional rules.
One approach to choice-of-forum agreements, the approach
adopted in England and the United States, is to allow courts the
discretion to decide the effect to be given the clause when includ-
ed in a contract with a developing country. When faced with a
dispute in which a developing country is involved, the court
should be alert to the possibility of an unequal bargaining relation-
ship, and should scrutinize the contract to determine to what ex-
tent the choice-of-forum provision is the product of lop-sided
negotiations. In this way, contractual freedom would be promoted,
but only to the extent that the interests of the developing country
102 Brown, supra note 11, at 287.
103 Brown states that:
In North Africa and the Middle East, the law as written has nothing to do with
the solution of the problems. Each developing country has a right to develop its
own internal system of law, but there has to be certainty that the law in existence
at the time a company goes into a country will not be changed arbitrarily to alter
completely the rules of the game on the basis of which the company made its
original decision to invest or transfer technology.
104 Christie, supra note 4, at 266-67.
"05 Id. at 267.
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are protected. Under this approach, there should be no presump-
tion of equal bargaining power,' and the presumption of validity
of a forum selection clause, as established by Zapata, ' should be
inapplicable to a contract with a developing country. Instead, the
court should require that the party seeking enforcement of the
clause demonstrate the reasonableness of the clause in light of the
circumstances surrounding the contract. Reasonableness could be
established by applying the standards enunciated in Zapata and in
subsequent United States cases. ' Where the party advocating en-
forcement of the clause fails to establish the reasonableness of the
clause, the court should refuse to enforce the choice-of-forum
agreement.
Cindy Noles
10 "Even outside the contract of adhesion field, abuse of such clauses is widespread. In
today's economy, equal bargaining power cannot be 'presumed'." Nadelmann, supra note 49,
at 134.
107 See notes 53-59 and accompanying text supra.
10 See notes 60-74 and accompanying text supra.
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